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This study investigates emotions conveyed in U.S. presidential speeches and media coverage 
regarding the Iraq war and the Iran nuclear deal during 2003 and 2015. The researchers 
gathered and examined news stories about the two policies, all official speeches delivered by 
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and opinion polls conducted during the respective 6-
month period in those two years. Nine discrete emotions were coded to capture the valence and 
volume in the speeches and news media content. The study finds that emotions appear more 
frequently in the Iraq discourse than in the Iran counterpart. President Bush used more negative 
emotions while President Obama employed more positive emotions. Emotion in the media 
coverage is constant and stable across the two policy periods; yet, negative emotions are more 
prevalent than positive counterparts in the media despite distinct foreign policies. The study 
also examines public opinion trends toward the two policies for inferring potential linkage. 
This article contributes to the conceptual nexus among emotional persuasion, journalism 
pattern, and foreign policy-making process. 
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Foreign policy decision-making hinges greatly on public sentiment. To persuade 
reluctant Americans to support participation in World War II, the United States (U.S.) 
government collaborated with media industries to produce propaganda to bolster patriotism and 
uplift emotions (Fyne 1997). Emotion arguably plays a critical role in all wars (Scheff 1994) 
and deserves to be examined in its relationship with foreign policy-making processes. In the 
past two decades, the U.S. has introduced two major foreign policies pertaining to the Middle 
East and public sentiment appears to be a crucial factor in forming a president’s persuasion 
strategy. This prompted us to investigate the relationship between uttered emotions in 
presidential speeches and the mediated sphere around critical foreign policies. 
The 2003 war in Iraq and the 2014 Iran nuclear deal were two significant foreign 
policies pursued by the U.S. Not only did the proposed resolutions diverge, but their respective 
communication characteristics elicited opposite reactions. At first glance, support for the Iraq 
War in 2003 reached 80%, while public support for the Iran deal hovered around 25% for most 
of 2015 (Pew Research Center). The statistics show that the majority of Americans accepted 
war as a viable option to international crises in 2003 while disapproved of the peaceful 
resolution with Iran in 2015. The large gap of public support between these two foreign policies is 
notable.  
The foreign policy toward Iraq resulted in a U.S. military invasion in 2003. In President 
Bush’s speeches, emotions are frequently incorporated. For example, on March 16, 2003 he 
said, “The dictator of Iraq and his weapons of mass destruction are a threat to the security of 
free nations. He is a danger to his neighbors. He's a sponsor of terrorism. He's an obstacle to 
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progress in the Middle East. For decades, he has been the cruel, cruel oppressor of the Iraq 
people.” This type of emotional appeal recurs throughout Bush’s speeches to convince the 
audience that military intervention was the only solution. Subsequently, his emotionally loaded 
rhetoric might have been willingly adopted by the media, and therefore, swayed the American 
public. 
President Obama took a drastically different, forthright approach, focusing on facts with 
much less emotion. In a speech delivered on July 21, 2015, for example, Obama said, “We also 
see the strength of American diplomacy in our comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran… And 
we're now engaged in an important debate, which is a good thing…So even as I make the case 
of why this is a critical deal to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, we're going to 
make sure the people know the facts.” These distinct approaches of persuasion–with or 
without emotion–merit an investigation to see if they are related to differed news coverage and 
public supports. The relationship between varied emotional appeals in political speeches and 
public opinion trends seems promising (Kuhne, et al. 2011), but an empirical inspection of the 
landmark cases is needed. 
At the center of this study lies emotion in political persuasion and media coverage of 
international policy. Affect is an integral part of political communication that fuels how people 
feel about an issue or policy (Ng and Kidder 2010). Therefore, emotion as an underlying 
component of political discourse may shed new light on responses to such policy initiatives as 
those toward Iran and Iraq. Given that presidential speeches are highly newsworthy, and 
political elites tend to opine and set policy discourse through the media, examining the 
relationship between presidential speeches and media coverage is essential to better understand 
opinion formation. It is also important to investigate whether public opinion toward foreign 
policy is associated with emotion–either purposefully orchestrated or accentuated–in media 
coverage. 
A survey of the existing literature on foreign policy indicates emotion is seldom a focus. 
While past studies identified potential casualties (Eichenberg, et al. 2006, Feaver, et al. 2006) 
or assumption of eventual victory (Voeten and Brewer 2006, Western 2009) as determinants of 
public support for war, analyses of international relations scarcely examined emotions. It is 
encouraging that researchers (e.g., Erisen and Villalobos 2014, Lerner, et al. 1998) have 
recognized that emotion plays a crucial role for presidential discourse and political behavior. 
Nevertheless, the void in the existing scholarship on how, and to what extent, emotion might 
have played a role in forming foreign policy initiatives makes examining the relationship 
between presidential speeches and media coverage necessary. 
This article investigates emotions conveyed in presidential speeches and media 
coverage and their relationship with public opinion on the U.S. military intervention in Iraq in 
2003 and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran in 2015. The researchers 
chose these two foreign policies based on the following rationale: their comparable 
significance and salience; similar region of geopolitics;  the president’s integral role in 
persuading the general public; the heightened media coverage and intense public reaction; and 
most importantly, the opposite nature of the policies. Admittedly it is nearly impossible to find 
two perfect, real cases to compare – with all contextual factors held constant. In both cases, 
nonetheless, the presidents introduced the initiatives to the American people in the hope of 
receiving support and subsequent approval from Congress; and the media’s devotion to 
significant time/space covering these policies. Primarily, these two foreign policies stand out 
conspicuously for their distinct orientations: war and peace. The varied emotion embedded in the 
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Emotion is an essential part of the human experience and can convey essential 
messages. Ekman (1992:170) said that “separate, discrete, emotional states, such as fear, anger, 
and enjoyment can be identified and differentiated with one another, not only in expression but 
probably in other important aspects, such as appraisal, antecedent events, probably behavioral 
response, physiology, etc.” Ekman identified six discrete emotions: anger, fear, sadness, 
enjoyment, disgust, and surprise, four of which are outright negative. There are disagreements 
on the number and dimensions of emotions, however. For example, Tomkins (1981) argued for 
nine discrete emotions: interest, enjoyment, surprise, fear, anger, distress, shame, contempt, 
and disgust; while Izard et al. (1993) posited ten by adding guilt to Tomkins’s list. Different 
emotions can be elicited and relevant under unique circumstances and contexts. Therefore, the 
international policy context in which this study is centered warrants examining the emotions 
that are truly relevant. 
Emotion is rarely addressed in foreign policy scholarship, but its impact in various 
contexts, including political campaigns and voting decisions, has been empirically investigated 
in political communication (Coleman and Wu 2015). Emotion can be immediately relatable and 
readily retrievable in policy discourse for both lay people and elite participants, yielding 
indistinct influence on decision-making. In other words, emotion can be critical to heuristic 
information processing (Chaiken 1980) in a situation of foreign policy discourse that commands 
complex information. Furthermore, research has found that it is impossible to separate emotion 
from the reasoning process (LeDoux 1996) and that emotion organizes human experience and 
forms cultural meaning (Ng & Kidder, 2010). Loseke (2009: 499) echoes the impact of emotion 
on cognitive ability, saying “it is not possible to separate thinking and feeling because feelings 
give rise to thoughts and thoughts give rise to feelings.” Furthermore, emotion may shape and 
alter realities for humans, producing enduring identities and relationships within society. The 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, cannot be understood without considering involved 
emotions (Halperin et al. 2008). Two peoples with diverse emotions—when the miracle of rebirth 
for one is the catastrophe of defeat and oppression for the other (Moisi 2010)—have been proved 
hard to reconcile. 
Emotion drives how humans communicate during critical times, which either 
encourages people to relate or conflict with one another. For foreign policy elites, emotion is 
one of the effective diplomatic devices in international negotiations or political persuasion 
(Hall 2015). Erisen and Villalobos (2014) say presidential speeches offer an opportunity to 
strike an emotional chord with the public and elevate citizens support. They found that, for 
presidents, connecting with the public emotionally allows them to create a sense of shared 
feelings, capitalize on it as a mandate, and leverage their political goals. To reach vast swaths 
of the public during critical times, emotion can present an effective shortcut (De Castella, et al. 
2009). Furthermore, Lerner and colleagues (1998) argue, intense emotion in mediated 
discourses entices the public to rely more heavily on heuristics rather than rational thoughts. 
While some citizens may be uninformed and lack appropriate knowledge to form sound opinion 
on a foreign policy initiative, they can resort to harboring sentiment to guide their reasoning 
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and decision-making processes (Chaiken 1980). This type of emotion-led cognitive evaluation 
is worth exploring as to whether government-orchestrated emotions and media-relayed 
sentiments correspond and also whether either source, alone or together, might have influenced 
public opinion.  
In terms of critical foreign policies, namely war or peace proposals, the existing 
literature on these two categories are lopsided–with far more scholarship devoted to studying 
wars. Loseke (2009), for example, argues that emotional discourse was at work to rally the 
American public to support the Iraq war. The most famous anecdote is that Churchill spoke to 
the British parliament and offered his “blood, toil, tears, and sweat,” effectively moving 
Britons’ opinion toward World War II (Lukacs 2009). More specifically, Nabi (1999) found 
that discrete emotions are associated with cognitive processing. In the same vein, affective 
intelligence theory (Marcus, et al. 2000) indicates that negative emotion can trigger further an 
individual’s cognitive interest and knowledge acquisition. Unfortunately, the existing literature 
has yet to take on examining positive emotions in relation to processing peace proposals. 
Therefore, there is a void in the literature; and it is worthwhile to investigate what types of 
emotions were employed by presidents to persuade the public under different circumstances. 
Our first set of research questions is as follows: 
RQ1: What kinds of discrete emotions were invoked in the presidential speech and media 
coverage of foreign policies toward Iraq and Iran, respectively?  
RQ2: Of the two foreign policies, which one employed more emotion in presidential speeches 
and media coverage? 
 
Framing war and peace with emotion 
 
Framing is relevant to this study due to its tendency and capacity to convey emotions 
that promote a desired impression and subsequently shape public opinion (Entman 2004). In 
other words, public office holders and the media have the power to influence the public’s 
views and interpretations of an issue through intentionally or unintentionally framed narratives 
about policy proposals. In studying this phenomenon, Entman (2004) found that when a news 
slant exists, the groups, causes, or individuals favored by the media become more prevalent or 
positive while other sides were brushed aside. It is most certain for any political leaders to 
purposively frame their advocated foreign policy in an instrumental way to galvanize public 
support (Mintz and Redd 2003); less certain is the extent to which emotional frames employed 
in presidential speeches are picked up by the media and the extent of autonomy news 
professionals exercise with emotional interpretation. 
Emotion is a usual suspect among politicians’ framing devices. For example, Ahmed 
(2013) highlights emotion used in British far-right political narratives to frame critical issues in 
the United Kingdom. Emotion was found highly relevant when effects of wartime journalism 
were gauged. Aday (2010) studied the media’s tendency to use soldier profiles and battle 
stories to inspire pride in audiences and, along with another study (Gross and Brewer 2007), 
found that hope and pride in the media coverage instilled a sense of public confidence in the 
government after the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. Regarding negative emotions, 
Aday (2010: 459) found that the media’s use of anger and disgust in war reporting makes the 
message less persuasive and concluded that “news, perhaps through framing, can stimulate 
emotional responses and shape policy beliefs.” Kang and Capella (2008), however, found that 
using two other negative discrete emotions–fear and sadness–in media reporting is more likely 
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to promote message persuasiveness during wartime. Peace proposals, on the other hand, have 
not been directly studied with emotion.  
Another reason to study emotion in mediated discussions of foreign policy is that it can 
influence the public’s evaluation of the policy (Coleman and Wu 2010). Examining the U.S. 
intervention in Iraq in 2003, Eshbaugh-Soha and Linebarger (2014) argue that average citizens 
pay scarce attention to policy details and simply use cues to form their opinion and decisions. 
This point echoes other scholars’ views (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997), who similarly describe 
average people as cognitive misers who depend on salient frames to promptly process complex 
information. People can process emotions easily and swiftly and political leaders often invoke 
them during war times. However, no prior empirical studies have demonstrated that effective 
campaigns can be orchestrated with emotions–particularly positive ones–in promoting peace 
deals with foreign countries. In recent history, positive emotions were found to associate with 
the public’s willingness to compromise and reconcile in Israeli-Palestinian (Jarymowicz and 
Bar-Tal 2006) and Northern Irish (Tam, et al. 2008) situations. The U.S. reached a peace treaty 
with Vietnam in 1973 and played a pivotal role in the short-lived peace agreement between 
Israel and Palestine in 1993. Nevertheless, emotion or public sentiment has not been a critical 
component in public communication to reach peace. Thus, the scarcity of relevant literature 
lends insufficient guidance for the present study. Given these, we ask the following questions: 
RQ3: How and to what extent did Presidents Bush and Obama use emotion in their speeches 
leading up to and after their foreign policies (regarding Iraq and Iran, respectively)? 
 
RQ4: How and to what extent do the emotions pertaining to either foreign policy exist in the 
news media? Does the news media’s emotional coverage echo the presidents’ speeches? 
 
Public opinion toward foreign policy 
Presidents often use public speeches broadcast via the media to move and shape public 
opinion in their favor. For example. President Bush iterated the phrase “axis of evil” and painted 
gruesome scenarios in his State of the Union address to convince Americans of the urgency for 
regime change in Iraq (Mral 2006). Consistently fueling riveting language to the media that 
instilled fear and inferred an imminent threat allowed Bush to capitalize on emotion as a driver 
for public support (Foyle 2004). 
In contrast, Obama did not appear to focus as much on actively employing emotions and 
mustering public support for the Iran peace agreement. Following a trend throughout his 
presidency, he acted without catering to the public’s preference when making critical policy 
decisions and the Iran nuclear agreement was no exception (Gilboa 2016). He was described to 
disregard the public sentiment and refused to let it constrain his decisions (Gilboa 2016). When he 
saw public support declining, his communication strategy was to explain the deal in detail with 
enthusiasm and a hopeful outlook, stressing international cooperation and Iran’s commitment. 
Western (2009) argues that non-military intervention, like the military counterpart, is usually 
acceptable to the public when they perceive likely victory. However, it is unclear whether the 
American people perceived the Iran peace deal would succeed.  
 Coe (2013) postulates that only looking at “real-world” factors without acknowledging the 
media’s role in international conflicts is inadequate because it ultimately shapes the public’s 
support level of military intervention. The loss of the Vietnam War prompted military-friendly 
historians (e.g., Hammond 1998) to conclude that, arguably, it was the media that lost the war, 
which subsequently led to the practice of embedded journalism during the Iraq War. Coe (2013) 
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also argues that focusing exclusively on political elite consensus and dissent in traditional 
foreign policy literature misses the essential media factor. 
Public opinion about war and peace proposals may also depend on the quantity of 
media coverage on the policy. The more coverage on a given policy, the more the public think 
about it (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Escalating coverage of a foreign policy increases the 
perceived salience of that foreign policy while also affecting assessment of the president’s 
performance. Similarly, Althaus and Kim (2006: 960) acknowledge the importance of coverage 
frequency as well as the “cumulative exposure to relevant news discourse and changes in the 
evaluative tone of that discourse.” Additionally, emotion as a crucial component in media 
agendas has been confirmed to transmit to audiences, affecting their judgement of issues 
(Coleman and Wu 2015, Kuhne et al. 2011). In other words, the more prominent certain 
emotions are conveyed in media coverage, the more the audience associate those emotions 
with covered issues. Therefore, both volume and valence of emotions conveyed by the media 
matter.  
To the best of our knowledge, public opinion for non-military intervention has not been 
examined except for two scenarios–immediately following a war or involving humanitarian 
purposes. Mor (1997: 197) argues that public support for non-military intervention is only 
attainable when there is a “shock-treatment to the system,” meaning dramatic peace initiatives 
that enhance feelings of resistance among the public. Additionally, he found that a peace 
agreement such as the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization is 
only acceptable to the public after they are acclimated to the idea; deep emotions from both 
sides can very well get in the way of acceptance. Sabucedo et al. (2011) found that whenever 
anger is present in government speeches, the public is less likely to consider alternate solutions 
to conflict, preferring a military option over diplomacy and compromise. They found that only 
when leaders express enthusiasm will the public support negotiation. 
Therefore, the president’s speeches and media coverage loaded with emotion that 
resonates with the proposal’s nature during critical times of foreign policy decisions have the 
potential to exacerbate the public’s attention and subsequently spur their support for the 
proposal. Based on this reasoning, we want to explore: 




To meet the goals of the present study, the researchers gathered all presidential speeches, 
news articles, and newscast transcripts centering on the two foreign policies during two six-
month time frames. Trained coders identified discrete emotions with three categories: 1) the 
emotion is absent, 2) the emotion is present, or 3) the emotion is the dominant emotion in the 
content. With the Likert-scaled design in emotion coding for all content, the researchers used the 
interval-level data to conduct statistical analyses. Two types of statistical output were produced for 
our empirical investigation: The first is the number of times an emotion appears in the content 
(either presidential speech or news); the second is the average level of an emotion appearing in 
the content. In addition, the coders identified emotional valence in each unit of the content–that is 
the dimensional emotion. This study analyzes the frequency, average emotional content, and 
valence in presidential speeches and media coverage during the two study periods.  
Knowing the different discrete emotions identified in the literature (Mauss and Robinson 
2009), the researchers conducted a pilot study of relevant content and included only those 
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discrete emotions highly relevant and identifiable in foreign policy discourse in the study. As a 
result, five of Ekman’s 1992 “six” (anger, fear, sadness, enjoyment, and disgust) as well as four 
(shame, enthusiasm, hope, and pride) from Tomkins’s (Tomkins 1981) and Izard and colleagues’ 
(Izard et al. 1993) lists are included in our list of nine discrete emotions.1 It is worth noting that 
some of the emotions, such as surprise, interest, distress, and contempt, are not suitable for this 
study because they are physiologically based and cannot be gauged without looking at orators. 
The coders of this study based their judgments of emotions on text-based content per se. 
For both Iraq and Iran policies, all speeches delivered by the two presidents (N = 161) as 
well as broadcast (CNN and FOX News) transcripts and newspaper (New York Times, and the 
Wall Street Journal) articles (N = 561) with the identical key words were included and analyzed. 
These media include both print and broadcast outlets and represent distinct political perspectives 
in the U.S. The content of the two policy cases was chosen based on a six-month period–three 
months before the president officially announced his foreign policy proposal toward Iraq or Iran 
and three months after. This six-month time frame of the content was decided because it can 
capture sufficient political discourse in both presidential speeches and media content; also it is 
long enough to incorporate the public’s potential change of opinion once a policy objective is 
announced, especially after media’s conjecture. 
Transcripts of presidential speeches were provided by The American Presidency Project 
(APP), hosted at the University of California Santa Barbara. Any presidential speech that 
mentions “Iraq” or “Iran” in the text of that speech during the six-month time frames was chosen 
for analysis. Based on these criteria, the researchers analyzed 133 of President Bush’s speeches 
and 28 of President Obama’s speeches. The same time frame was applied for the retrieval of all 
media content. The researchers retrieved and collected media content from CNN, FOX News, 
and the New York Times via Nexis, a commercial database, using either term “Iraq War” or “Iran 
Nuclear Agreement” in newscast transcript or story headlines; likewise, the researchers retrieved 
and collected the Wall Street Journal articles from the paper’s archive directly, using the 
identical search terms and time frame. The four media outlets were chosen based on their high 
readership or viewership, tendency to set news agendas, and differed political views.  
Two trained coders each coded 100 random units of the collected content to test 
intercoder reliability. The coders used the same codebook, which provided precise definitions 
and instructions for all coding items. Multiple discrete emotions (e.g., fear and anger in the same 
news story) as well as varied levels of discrete emotions could be noted within a single content. 
After several rounds of training, intercoder reliability test resulted in a satisfactory rate–α values 
for dimensional emotions and seven of the nine discrete emotions range from .873 to 1 with 
Krippendorff’s (2018) formula. Two discrete emotions, joy and enthusiasm, appeared too 
infrequently to be tested correctly, yet their agreement rates reach 100% and 97%, respectively.  
Aside from coding of speech and media coverage, this study used a dataset of existing 
public opinion polls of nationwide samples conducted by news media, polling agencies, and non-
profit organizations. These polls–derived from The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at 
Cornell University–gauged American public support for either the Iraq war or the Iran nuclear 
deal. The time frame used to identify the polls is identical to the time frame during which 
presidential speeches and media coverage were gathered. It should be noted that polling results 
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The first notable finding about the content of the two foreign policies produced during 
the two periods is their stark difference in volumes. President Bush delivered far more 
speeches on Iraq (N=133) than did Obama on the JCPOA (N=28). The news media, on the 
contrary, rendered the opposite of the above pattern. There is far less coverage about Iraq 
(N=178) than about Iran (N=383). Emotion in the policy discourse (see Table 1), appears in 
79% of Bush’s speeches versus 64% of Obama’s speeches. Similarly, emotion appears more 
frequently in media coverage of the Iraq war than the Iran peace deal, which provides the 
answer to RQ2. A much higher dose of negative emotion and also slightly more presence of 
positive emotion exist in the media coverage of the Iraq war declaration than in the coverage of 
peace proposal with Iran–even though there is far more coverage about the latter.2  
Inspecting the 9 discrete emotions across two sources, we found that the news 
corresponds well with Bush’s speeches (only enthusiasm produces significant difference, see 
the t-test results presented in Table 2) but not with Obama’s speeches (3 significant 
differences–fear, anger, and hope, plus overall discrete emotions). Based on these results, we 
can confidently deduce that the mediated discourse about the Iraq policy is more likely to 
resonate with Bush’s speeches and to convey emotions than the Iran counterpart. 
Tables 1 & 2 here 
RQ1 aims at unveiling the discrete emotions in the discourse of the foreign policies, 
with both presidential speeches and media coverage analyzed. During the Iraq period, both 
positive and negative emotions are present in presidential speeches and media coverage. 
Specifically, as Table 2 indicates, fear, sadness, and disgust are rather prominent on the 
negative spectrum while hope, pride, and joy stand out on the positive spectrum. Both Bush’s 
speeches and the news coverage roughly correspond to each other regarding discrete emotions. 
During the Iran deal period, however, the discrete emotions existing in Obama’s speeches and 
media coverage differ greatly. The only significant emotion appearing in the Obama’s speeches 
is hope while the coverage of the Iran deal is teeming with anger, fear, and somewhat disgust, 
and merely a modest dose of hope.  
RQ3 focuses on the potential difference between the two presidents in their uses of 
emotion in speeches. Based on the measurement of discrete emotions that falls on the scale of 
zero to two, when all emotions are included, Bush’s average is .20 and Obama’s average is .07. 
Bush’s average negative emotion is .26, compared to Obama’s average of .01. Bush’s average 
positive emotion is .12, compared to Obama’s .15. As Table 2 indicates, the differences 
between Bush and Obama in their uses of discrete emotions are statistically significant, except 
for shame, enthusiasm, and pride. Not only did Bush use emotions more frequently than 
Obama, he used them in greater magnitude. Two distinct emotions truly differentiate the two 
presidents’ approaches that are worth highlighting here—Bush used much more fear in his 
messages to persuade the American public while Obama resorted to more hopeful narratives. 
RQ4 centers on the existence of emotions in the media coverage. Discrete emotions 
appear in 80% of the media coverage during the Iraq war period and 59% of media coverage 
during the Iran nuclear agreement period. Interestingly, the average emotion conveyed in the 
media coverage remains stunningly constant across the two study periods, ranging from .15 to 
.14. As mentioned above, Bush’s speeches contain ample emotion and the media seem to 
correspond to it considerably. There is only .05 difference in the average emotions between 
Bush’s speeches and media coverage during the Iraq war period.  
During the Iran deal period, the average emotion in the media coverage is twice as 
much as that in Obama’s speeches—.14 vs. .07. The average negative emotion in Obama’s 
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speeches is extremely low (M = .01), but the media’s average negative emotion reaches .20. 
While positive emotion is notable in Obama’s speeches (M = .15), the media coverage average 
at .06 strays significantly from his lead. The divergence of emotion found between the 
speeches and the news media during the Iran period is in stark contrast with the convergence 
unveiled during the Iraq period. The levels of average negative and positive emotions in the 
media and speeches during the Iraq war period resemble each other. Negative emotion in the 
media differs from that in the Bush speeches by merely .01 and positive content in the media 
only by .03. During the Iran period, negative emotion in the media is larger than in the Obama 
speeches by .19, while positive emotion is less by .09. Another notable aspect of the media 
coverage is emotion’s seemingly stable presence across the two periods. 
The polling results obtained from the Roper Center archive3 show that initial public 
support for the Iraq war before the official announcement hovers around 60%. The percentage 
of support dips below 50% briefly and then bounces back up higher, to reach almost 80%. The 
public support for the Iraq operation remains high in the second part of the study period, while 
the percentages of people who oppose the war go down from 40% to 20%. In contrast, the 
opinion trend for the Iran deal shifts quite differently. The support for the nuclear deal reaches 
62% at the outset, moves up and down between 30-40%, and then settles below 30% in August 
2015. Meantime, the disapproval of the peace proposal rises from 25% to more than 55% in 
two months, ending at 60% in August 2015.  
As is in every significant foreign policy, compounding and interconnected factors may 
have resulted in differed opinion trends toward the Iraq and Iran policies. The historical 
background of the U.S.’s relationship with either nations, the nature of the proposed policies, 
and the emotions in the discourses could all play a role. For example, the high level of support 
for invading Iraq could stem from the “rally around the flag” effect that was prevalent after the 
attacks on September 11, 2001 (Schubert, et al. 2002). With limited and irregular polling 
points, we unfortunately cannot pursue rigorous statistical testing between public support and 
the emotional component in presidential speeches across the six-month period. Yet, based on 
41 national polls conducted during the Iraq policy period and 15 counterparts during the Iran 
period, the average support for the Iraq policy (59%) is higher than the Iran counterpart (38%); 
and the average percentage to oppose the Iraq policy (36%) is lower than the Iran counterpart 
(44%). With the above opinion indicators, combined with the salience of emotions (particularly 
negative discrete emotions) employed in Bush’s speeches during the Iraq policy period, 
compared with the lack of emotions in Obama’s speeches about the Iran deal (t = 4.167, df 
=159, p < .01), there appears to be a positive association between emotion in presidential 
speeches and policy support. The markedly salient emotions of fear, anger, and sadness in 
Bush’s speeches vs. hope in Obama’s speeches are indicative of potential impact of negative 
emotions on policy support. 
Likewise, the relationship between emotions conveyed in the media coverage and 
public support is examined. With the evidence of statistically significant differences of media 
coverage in average emotion (t = 3.125, df =551, p < .01) and in six of the nine discrete 
emotions between the two foreign policies, it is reasonable to infer a potentially positive 
association between the mediated emotion and contrasting opinion trends during the two policy 
periods. Examining the 9 discrete emotions further, we find that fear and sadness are notably 
highlighted in the Iraq coverage while anxiety is emphasized more in the Iran coverage. 
Interestingly, there is also a higher dose of pride and joy in the Iraq coverage than in the Iran 
counterpart.  
 




Discussion and Conclusion 
Based on the results yielded from two landmark foreign policies, we conclude that 
mediated political discourse with high frequency of emotional content—particularly negative 
emotion—is positively associated with public support more than the counterpart with low or 
positive emotion. President Bush employed greater emotion throughout his speeches leading 
up to and immediately after his declaration to invade Iraq, which worked better than President 
Obama’s strategy of remaining matter-of-fact and positive for the JCPOA. President Bush’s 
frequent use of emotion also appears to resonate well with the media’s preference for 
emotional coverage, which simultaneously or subsequently led the public to concur. 
Alternatively, President Obama’s use of positive language did not register well with the 
media’s well-documented tendency to lean negative (Arango-Kure, et al. 2014). Therefore, 
news media tend to mirror the president more when he uses negative emotional language but 
ignore the cue when the president uses positive emotion. Therefore, based on these two 
examined cases, the public is more reliant on negative emotion in political discourses to shape 
their opinion toward foreign policy. 
Our research result unveils the potentially important role emotion plays in presidential 
speeches and media coverage about crucial foreign policies. When used by a president in 
speeches, certain emotions appear to trickle down through the media more effectively than 
others. For example, the salient negative emotions delivered in the Bush speeches were echoed 
by the media whereas the negligible negative emotions conveyed by Obama were ignored 
while his hopefulness was notably squashed in the news coverage. This pattern supports the 
known tendency of the media practice covering more negative news—but a more 
consequential question for future researchers is whether negative emotions drive media 
coverage. Emotion in presidential speeches subsequently can be instrumental in shaping and 
moving public opinion, particularly when there exists a high level of negative emotion, such as 
anger and fear. President Bush’s regular use of highly negative emotion in his speeches, albeit 
with the help of the rally effect (Schubert, et al. 2002), presents an effective persuasion strategy 
in boosting public support. Alternatively, positive emotional language such as hope and joy 
appear to yield less of an effect in shaping news coverage or public opinion. Both media 
professionals’ and the public’s inclination for bad news appears to be consistent (Biswas, et al. 
1994). President Obama’s seldom use of emotions, particularly negative ones in his speeches, 
and Americans’ lackluster support for his Iran peace treaty also provide a vivid case.  
In today’s policy-making environment, the media are often the key mediator between the 
policy maker and the public. The level of salience of a foreign policy that registers with average 
citizens may hinge on the media’s treatment. Therefore, it is important to heed to the media’s 
inclination of including emotion in its coverage, particularly negative emotions. Policy makers 
should be aware that the media’s persistent preference of negative, controversial coverage 
reflects their business interests, and that negativity has long been considered a type of 
conventional newsworthiness to journalists. It is still quite telling that when the media receive 
strong negative emotional cues from the president, reporting is more likely to align with his tone. 
Yet, when weak, positive emotional cues from the president come along, media reporting is more 
likely to defy. Therefore, this pattern suggests that policy makers’ negative, highly emotional 
content can yield more similarly emoted mediated discourse than the counterpart.  
The media often sway the public’s support with their coverage of military intervention 
early on when political elites are typically in consensus and the press is presenting patriotic, 
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casualty-free coverage (Aday 2010). Prior scholarship has not unveiled the media’s coverage 
of peace proposals, let alone associated emotions. This study suggests that one mechanism 
through which the interactive dynamic occurs is through the emotional discourse initiated by 
the president. Both Bush and Obama used varied emotional language in their respective 
speeches leading up to and after important foreign policy decisions. And the consequences of 
their distinct approaches, given the opposite opinion trends, cannot be more lucid. 
The trickle-down effect of negative emotion may affect the public more than commonly 
recognized by the mainstream media and the public. The collated data suggest that the public 
have relied on negative, strongly emotional discourse more to form their opinions. Polls show 
that the public respond swiftly to negative emotions, particularly when the president urges 
action in response to a clear and present danger. People tend not to rely on strong emotional 
discourse when it is predominantly positive and potentially promising; particularly because the 
president’s use of positive language does not allow for the creation and augmentation of an evil 
enemy dramatized and capitalized on by the media. The question we must turn to is whether 
peace is harder to sell than war. How political leaders, policy elites, and perhaps media 
consultants can effectively persuade citizens to accept peace resolutions is of great concern. 
Furthermore, what kind of emotional frame can policy makers utilize to resonate with the 
public and elevate peace’s chance?    
This article highlights the role emotions play in the interaction between presidential 
speeches and news media coverage; and how they might be related to reaching sound and well-
thought-out foreign policies via public engagement. Understanding the role of emotion in 
political communication processes illuminates how Americans made up their minds about the 
two foreign policy initiatives. Acknowledging the power of emotion also illustrates how policy 
makers can effectively harness emotion to amass public support. To engage the public in a 
responsible way and induce sound policies, it is essential for all involved parties to understand 
the process more clearly. Understanding the underlying mechanism of emotion in shaping 
mediated discussion of critical foreign policy will enhance the quality of decision-making 
processes. 
This study is particularly relevant to today’s political and media environment. The 
public is increasingly accessible via varied media platforms, and so are political leaders. 
Governments need to prepare for the public’s swift response to foreign policy, particularly 
when it is conveyed in 280 characters or less. The increasing use of social media by the public 
and public offices encourages emotion over detail or facts. Yet, communicating a complex 
foreign policy decision via a short message is not easy, especially when it contains highly 
detailed information that can overwhelm even the most patient policy wonks. Using emotion to 
explain any policy is a luring shortcut at reaching the public and elicit strong attention. And 
political leaders around the world are keenly aware that as communication mechanisms evolve, 
the power of emotion looms larger.  
This study only investigated two distinct international cases to better understand the 
influence of emotions in foreign policy on the American public. The involved U.S. presidents, 
the unique media environments, and the specific political situations when the two foreign 
policies were introduced and deliberated differ—and these factors will also change in the 
future. Therefore, generalizability of our findings in other or future cases is not entirely 
established. Moreover, the study of mediated emotion in political discourse, especially on 
peace deals, is scarce. Future research should examine the influence of discrete emotions more 
closely in longitudinal and systematic manner. Understanding the impact of each distinct 
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emotion on communication can enhance our prediction about the media’s treatment as well as 
public opinion. Additionally, emotion in social media may prove to be particularly salient due 
to the increasing use of social media by leaders and policy elites to reach their virtual circles. 
One weakness of this study is that these two policies not only have different assumed 
outcomes but also diverse contextual and historical factors. While Bush’s main objective was 
to go to war, Obama’s objective was to avoid war. People who might have already harbored 
existing attitudes toward either country or objective may respond differently to such situations 
and lean toward supporting either policy. Future research may examine a greater number of 
foreign policies with similar objectives and backgrounds to enhance external validity. This 
study hopes to draw more interest in including emotion as a factor in political communication 
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Dimensional emotion in presidential speecha and media coverageb 
 
                          % Mean  Negative     Positive 
 
Iraq         
Speech   79  .20  .26  .12 
Media   80  .15  .27  .09 
 
Iran               
Speech   64  .07  .01  .15 
Media   59  .14  .20  .06   
 
a X2 = 21.21 df = 3 p < .01 
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Table 2  
Discrete emotion in presidential speech and media coverage 
 
 Presidential speech  Media coverage 
    Iraq  Iran         Iraq       Iran 
 M (SD) M (SD)  M (SD) M (SD) 
Anger .26 (.60)1 .00 (0)1 a  .30 (.60)8 .44 (.73)8 a 
Fear .60 (.74)2 .07 (.26)2 b  .52 (.73)9 .40 (.69)9 b 
Shame .02 (.12) .00 (.00)  .02 (.13) .01 (.13) 
Disgust .17 (.42)3 .00 (.00)3  .14 (.41)10 .13 (.42)10 
Sadness .26 (.53)4 .00 (.00)4  .35 (.69)11 .05 (.25)11 
Enthusiasm .02 (.15)e .00 (.00)  .00 (.00)e .00 (.05) 
Hope .16 (.41)5 .54 (.58)5 c  .15 (.42) .12 (.35)c 
Pride .12 (.35) .07 (.26)  .06 (.29)12 .03 (.19)12 
Joy .21 (.46)6 .00 (.00)6  .16 (.43)13 .09 (.36)13 
Total 1.81 (1.40)7 .67 (.82)7 d  1.71 (1.43)14 1.28 (1.50)14 d 
Values that share superscript numbers and letters differ at .05 statistical significance. 
